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A. No. 20462.

In Bank.

Apr. 28. 1950.]

R. C. LITTLE et a1., Appellants, v. MOUNTAIN VIEW
DAIRIES. INC. (a Corporation). Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Orders Appealable-Order on Motion for Ju~gment
on Pleadings.-An order granting a motion for judgment on
the pleadings is not final or appealable, and it is only from
the subsequently entered judgment that an appeal will lie.
(2] Cotenancy-Use of Property-Charge for Drilling and Operating Expenses.-If one cotenant prodtlcell oil, he is entitled to
charge the interests of nonproducing cotenants for their proportionate share of drilling and operating expenses.
[3] Id.-Lease by Cotenant.-A cotenant by ratifying an oil and
gas lease by his cotenant, under which the expense incurred
by the owners of the mineral rights in producing the oil from
the land was representpd by five-sixths of the oil that the lessee
retained from the total production, agreed that this was a fair
charge for the expense of bringing the oil to the surface.
[4] Oil-Sale or Grant.-A grant of a fraction of all the oil in and
under the land "and which may hereafter be produced nnd
saved" creates, in the absence of extrinsic evidence or other
controlling language in the deed, an expense-bearing mineral
fee interest rather than an expense-free royalty interest.

[lJ See 2 Cal.Jur. 157; 2 Am.Jur. 897.
[2] Basis of computation of cotenant's accountability for minerals removed from property, note, 5 A.L.R.2d 1368,1380.
[4] See 8 Ca.l.Jur.lO-Yr. Supp. (1948 Rev.) 616; 24 Am.Jur. 529.
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Appeal and Error, § 42; [2] Cotenancy, § 19; (3J Cotenancy, § 31; [4J Oil, § 12.
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APPEAL from a jUdgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County and from an order denying plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting that of defendant. Franklin G. West, Judge. Judgment reversed; appeal from order
dismissed.
Action for declaratory relief. JUdgment for defendant reversed.
Dolley, Knight, Woods & Hightower and Arthur B. Knight
for Appellants.
Richard A. Grant, Warren S. Pallette, Paul A. Lower, S. E.
Cavanaugh, L. R. Seaman, Rush M. Blodget, Alfred W.
Mitchem and Gordon A. Goodwin as Amici Curiae on behalf
of A ppelJants.
Joseph A. Ball and E. P. Mulholland for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-ln 1935 plaintiffs' predecessors in interest
in certain real property granted to defendant a limited interest in that property described as "Eight and one-thIrd per
cent (8-1;3 %) of all oil. gas and other hydrocarbon substances.
and minerals, in, under and/or which may be hereaftpr pro·
duced and saved fnlll" thp property. In 1945 plaintiffs leased
the property to Loren L. Hillman, Inc., for the purpose of
producing oil and gas. The lease reserved to plaintiffs as
lessors a royalty of one-sixth of all oj} produced and saved
from the premises. The lease also provided in part as follows:
"10. In case said Lessor owns a less interest in the above
described lands than the entire and undivided fee simple
estate therein, then the royalties and rentals herein provided
for shall be paid the said Lessor only in the proportion which
his interest bears to the whole undivided fee.
" lO-a. Lessor agrees that in no event shall Lessee be
required to pay greater rents or royalties than provided in
this lease and Lessor further agrees that Lessor will fully
satisfy and discharge any and all of the obligations and requirements under [the deed to defendant] insofar as tbeabove
described land and the production therefrom is concerned. And
Lessor further agrees to protect Lessee against any expense,
loss or damage arising as a result of claims or rights asserted by
others in or under said deed above referred to."
Defendant did not sign the lease but executed a separate
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document attached thereto, which reads as follows: "The
within Oil and Gas Lease is hereby ratified, approved and
confirmed. "
The present controversy is over the proportions in which
plaintiffs and defendant shall share the one-sixth (16% % )
royalty payable by the lessee under the lease. Plaintiffs by
their complaint for declaratory relief claimed that they were
entitled to eleven-twelfths of the royalty. Defendant answered
and cross-complained, claiming one-twelfth of all the oil produced or 50 per cent of the royalty. Each party moved for
judgment on the pleadings, and the court decided in favor of
defendant and entered its judgment accordingly. Plaintiffs
have appealed from the minute order granting defendant '8
motion and denying theirs, and from the judgment. [1] It
is Rettled that an order granting a motion for judgment on
the pleading!'; is not final or appealable, and that it is only
from the subsequently entered judgment that an appeal will
lie. (Holton v. Noble, 83 Cal. 7, 9 [23 P. 58] ; Montgomery
Ward &- Co. v. Welch, 17 Cal.App.2d 127, 129 [61 P.2d 790);
Overton v. White, 18 Cal.App.2d 567, 568-569 [64 P.2d 758,
65 P.2d 99] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 963.) Accordingly, the appeal
from the order must be dismissed.
Before the oil and gas lease was executed, plaintiffs and
defendant were tenants in common in the exclusive right to
drill for and produce oil from the land. (See Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden,4 Ca1.2d 637, 649 [52 P.2d 237).)
Their respective interests were defined by the grant deed from
plaintiffs' predecessors in interest to defendant. If, as plaintiffs contend, the deed conveyed no more than a one-twelfth
interest in the grantors' mineral rights, their interests were
in the ratio of eleven to one.
[2] It is settled that if one cotenant produces oil, he is entitled to charge the interests of non producing cotenants for
their proportionate share of drilling and operating expenses.
(Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp. v. Walden,4 Ca1.2d 637, 657 [52
P.2d 237] ; see, also, McCord v. Oakland Q. M. Co., 64 Cal.
134, 148-149 [27 P. 863,49 Am.Rep. 686] ; anno., 5 A.L.R.2d
1368, 1380.) [3] In this case the expense incurred by the owners of the mineral rights in producing the oil from the land is
represented by the five-sixths of the oil that the lessee retains
from the total production. By ratifying the lease defendant
agr('ed that this is a fair ('harge for the expense of bringing
the oil to the surface. (Gill v. Bennett, (Tex.Civ.App.) 59
S.W.2d 473, 475; Texas &- Pacific Goal & Oil Go. v. Kirtley,
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(Tex.Civ.App.) 288 S.W. 619,622.) "If a lease be executed
by a cotenant, the non consenting cotenants may recognize the
lease and receive their fractional interest in the royalty, or
they may reject the lease, and receive their fractional part
of the oil produced, less their proportionate part of the cost
of discovery and production." (Davis v. Atlalltic Oil Producillg Co., 87 F.2d 75, 77.)
Section 10 of the lease provides for the payment to plaintiffs of that proportion of rentals and royalties that their interest bears to the whole undivided fee in the real property.
Section 10-a of the lease does not increase the share of the
royalties to which defendant would otherwise be entitled.
That section merely binds plaintiffs to "satisfy and discharge
any and all obligations and requirements under" the deed to
defendant. It does not purport to state what those obligations
are. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine whether the
deed conveyed only one-twelfth of the mineral rights, or on
the contrary, as defendant contends, it conveyed an expensefree or royalty interest that would entitle defendant to onetwelfth of the oil produced free of any cost of production.
[4] Defendant contends that the addition of the words
"and which may hereafter be produced and saved" to a grant
()f a fraction of all the oil in and under the land clearly evidence an intent that the interest granted should be expense
free. It has been generally held, however, that a grant of a
fraction of all "of the oil, gas and other minerals in and
under, and that may be produced" from the land creates an
expense-bearing mineral fee interest rather than an expensefree royalty interest. (Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 [185
S.W.2d 563, 564-565] , Watkins v. Slaughter, 144 Tex. 179 [189
S.W.2d 699, 700] ; Jones v. Bedford, (Tex.Civ.App.) 56 S.W.
2d 305; Gill v. Bennett, (Tex.Civ.App.) 59 S.W.2d 473,475;
Hinkle v. Gauntt, Okla. - - [206 P.2d 1001, 1005];
Manley v. Boling, 186 Okla. 59 [96 P.2d 30, 31-32] ; Shinn v.
Buxton, 154 F.2d 629, 631-635; see, also, Brooks v. Mull, 147
Kan.740 [78 P.2d 879, 883].) When there is an existing oil
lease at the time the lessor executes a mineral deed, it is not
uncommon for the deed to grant not only a given fraction of
all the oil in, under, and that may be produced from the land,
but also the same fractional interest in the royalties payable
under the lease. (See 3 Summers, Oil and Gas [Perm. ed.],
§ 606, p. 502.) If the first clause of such a deed were construed as creating an expense-free royalty interest, it would
grant the stated fraction of the total production rather than
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the stated fraction of the landowner's royalty reserved under
the lease, and would therefore be inconsistent with the second
clause. It has been held, however, that such deeds are Dot i
internally inconsistent and that the grant of the stated frac-'
tion of the royalties under the existing lease is merely a statement of the legal effect of granting the same fraction of all
the oil in, under and that may be prod~ced from the land.
(Shinn v. Buxton, 154 F.2d 629, 631-635; Richardson v. Hart,
'143 Tex. 392 [185 S.W.2d 563,564-565].)
It is contended that because of differences in the applicable theories of oil and gas rights, authorities from other
jurisdictions are of no value in interpreting the language of
a grant of mineral rights in California land. There is nothing,
however, in the theory of oil and gas rights in California to
cause this court to reject the interpretation that has been
adopted by the courts of otlwr states in construing language
similar to that in the deed in this case. California has rejected
the theory of ownership of oil and gas in place (Callahan v.
Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 118 143 P.2d 788, 101 A.L.R. 871]),
and language in a grant refel'rmg to oil to be produced would
therefore have less significance in determining the expensefree or expense-bearing nature of the interest created than
similar language in Ii deed dealing with land in a state, such
as Texas, where the theory of title to oil and gas in place has
been retained. (Richardson v. Hart, 143 Tex. 392 [185
S. W .2d 563, 564 J.) In California the parties might well doubt
the effectiveness of a conveyance limited to a fraction of all
the oil and gas in and under the land and therefore add a
reference to oil to be produced, without in any waJ mtending
to convey more than the stated fraction of all the oil rights
appurtenant to the land. (See Dabney-.lohnston Oil Corp.
v. Walden, 4 Ca1.2d 637, 648-649 [52 P.2d 237].)
Furthermore, the decision in Dabney-Johnston Oil Corp v.
Walden,4 Ca1.2d 637 [52 P.2d 237], indicates that the addition of the words "which may be hereafter produced and
saved" after a grant of a fraction of all of the oil in and
under the land does not have the effect of creating an expensefree interest. In that case there was a grant of "a two per
cent in said land owners royalt;\' of all gas, oil and other
hydrocarbon substances to be produced and saved and sold
from said described land. .. " The interest was described
as a royalty interest, and in holding it expense-free, the court
rea!;oned that since the 2 per cent interest had bren carved
from the land owner's 27% per cent expens.~-fJ,"~~ royalty
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under an existing lease, it would necessarily be implied that
after the termination of the lease, the 2 per cent interest remained expense-free. It placed no reliance on the words "to
be prod uced and saved and sold from said described land,"
pointing out that the quoted language was inserted for another
purpose than to indicate how the expenses were to be aIlot:ated. It was contended that under the deed the grantee
was entitled to royalties only if a lessee was producing oil,
not if another cotenant was producing it. In answering this
contention the court said, "That the parties in the instant
cas£" did not contemplate that a single producing tenant should
retain the entire output is indicated by the stipulation of facts
and the reforming clause added to the assignment, which expressly provide that the rights of the assignees extend not only
to oil within and beneath the land, but to all oil and other
h~'drocarbon substances produced and saved from the land,
however said substances should be produced." (4 Ca1.2d at
657.) It is clear, therefore, that in California as in other jurisdictions, in the absence of extrinsic evidence or other controlling language in the deed, a grant of a fraction of all the
oil in, under and that may be produced and saved from the
land creates an expense-bearing mineral fee interest.
Barnard v. Jamison, 78 Cal.App.2d 136 [177 P.2d 341],
does not support a contrary result. In that case the grant
deed contained a clause that specifically provided what expenses the fractional interests conveyed should bear, and the
court properly held that this clause was determinative of the
issue.
The appeal from the order granting the motion for judgment on the pleadings is dismissed. The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-In December, 1935, the then
owners of the involved land executed and delivered to defendant an instrument entitled" Grant Deed," in which it is declared that such owners" do hereby grant to [defendant] . . .
Eight and one-third per cent (8Va%) of all oil, gas and other
hydrocarbon substances, and minerals, in, under/or which
may be hereafter produced and saved from" such land. In
August, 1936, the land was conveyed to plaintiffs, with the
express exception of the percentage interest in the oil, gas and
other minerals which had theretofore been transferred to defendant. By reason of the earlier conveyance and the express
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exception it is obvious that plaintiffs never acquired more than
91% per cent of the oil and mineral rights. In February.
1945, plaintiffs, as lessors, entered into an oil lease covering
the property. The lease provides for a % (16%%) landowner's royalty payable to plaintiffs and expressly requires
of plaintiffs that (Par. 10-a) "in no event shall Lessee be
required to pay greater rents or royalties than provided in this
lease and Lessor [plaintiffs] further agrees that Lessor will
fully satisfy and discharge any and all of the obligations and
requirements under that certain Deed [to defendant, of its
percentage interest in the oil, gas and other minerals] . . .
insofar as the above described land and the production therefrom is concerned." Defendant did not sign the lease as a ,
lessor and is not named as such. Its character or relationship.
as being distinct from that of cotenant lessor, is indicated bJ .
the provision above quoted and by the fact that under date .
of March 1, 1945, it executed a writing attached to the lease
which reads: "The within Oil and Gas Lease is hereby ratified. approved and confirmed." Obviously, the defendant, by
the terms of the lease, by the substance of its endorsement 1
thereon, and by the language of the original conveyance to it,
is not a mere cotenant lessor. It is the owner of what heretofore in California has been termed a royalty interest-of 8%
per cent of "all" oil and gas which may be "produced and
saved" from the land. The lessee has "produced and saved" ,
oil and gas from the demised premises and the sole question is:
Is defendant entitled to 8% per cent of aU the" produced and
saved" oil and gas or only to 8% per cent of that share of the
oil and gas (U) which plaintiffs as lessors reserved in their \
lease agreement with the producers f
The trial court accepted the language of the conveyance to . '
defendant and adjudged that the defendant owns 8% per
cent of all "oil, gas and other hydrocarbon substances and
minerals in, under and/or which have heretofore or may hereafter be produced and saved" from the land; that defendant
is entitled to receive that percentage of the total production;
and that plaintiffs "shall account to and pay over to the defendant . . . the proceeds from the sale of 8%% of 100% or"
the total production. Plaintiffs urge, however, and the majority now hold, that defendant is entitled not to 8% per
cent of all the oil and gas "produced and saved" from the
premises. but only to 8% per cent of one-sixth of the oil and
gas 80 produced and saved. This Rtartling result is accomplished by bolding that the conveyance to defendant did not
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give it a royalty interE'st in the oil but that it is a tenant in
common of land or mineral rights in fee with plaintiffs and
is entitled merely to a share of their lessors' royalty.
In support of the majority position it is argued that the
language of the conveyance to defendant creates a fee interest
in minerals, rathE'r than a royalty interest j that, therefore,
under the holdings of certain cases from other states, constrning various contracts and conveyances, defendant should
be held entitled to no more than 8% per cent of the plaintiffs'
% lea!lE' royalty; and, further, that as a cotenant holder of a
"fee interest" in thE' oil and gas rights to the land, as well as
by reason of defendant's ratification of the lease, defendant
should pay its" proportion of drilling and operation expenses"
(see Dabney·.10hnston Oil Corp. v. Walde'll (1935), 4 Ca1.2d
637, 657 f 52 P .2d 237 J) and should share in royalties under
the lease on the property in the same proportion that its •• fee
intE'rl'st bears to the total fee interest." I am satisfied that
upon the law as hE'retofore established in California such position is untenable. This court has definitely rejected the·theory
that th(" transfer of fractional oil rigbts in land constitutes
a transfE'r of a f("(" interest in the oil, and has held that in
this state the transferee of such rights receives a royalty interest; i. e., an interest in rE'al property in the nature of an
incorporeal hereditament, which he holds as 8 cotenant with
the other owners of oil rights in the same land. (See Callahan
v. Marti'll (1935), 3 Cal.2d 110, 125, 126 [43 P.2d 788. ]01
A.L.R. 871] ; Dabney-.lohnston Oil Corp. v. Walden (1935),
~ltpra, 4 Ca1.2d 637, 649, 650, 654: Schiffman v Richfield Oil
Co. (1937), 8 Cal.2d 211, 223-224 [64 P.2d )081) ; La Laguna
Ranch Co. v. Dodge (1941), 18 Cal.2d 132, 135 [114 P.2d 351,
135 A.L.R. 546] ; Tanner v. Title Ins. &- Trust Co. (1942).20
Cal.2d 814, 819-820 [129 P.2d 3831: Tanner v. Olds (1946),
29 Ca1.2d 110,116 [173 P.2d 6, 167 A.L.R. 12191.)
Plaintiffs concede that if the parties t.o a conveyance .. intended the conveyance to be of a royalty interest, it is generally held that the grantf'e takes what may be termed a nonexpense bearing interest, or a net interest in the royalty reserved in any lease on the land." As pointed out in thl." Dabney-Johnston case, at page 653, the "language of a grant is
to bE' construed most strongly against the grantor" (see, also,
Civ. Code, § 1069; Beam. v. Dugga,n (1933),132 Cal.App. 546,
5!lO f23 P.2d 581) and (p. 657), "where cotenancy interests
have been sold with the understanding and agreement that
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they shall not be subject to such charge [for a proportion of
drilling and operation expense], but that other units shall
hear the fnll expense of production . . . such agrp-ement of
the parties, express or necessarily implied [is controlling]."
Here the grant to defendant unequivocany specifies that defendant is to receive BYs per cent of "all oil, gas . . . which
may be hereafter produced and saved from" the land invol ved,
and no mention or provision is made of a requirement that
defendant pay, or be charged with, a share of the cost of production, or any other debit against his interest, under a lease
for oil development which might subsequently be executed
by the grantor or his successors in title. It would seem that,
as commented by the court in Barnard v. Jamison (1947),78
Cal.App.2d 136, 141 [177 P.2d 341], "the words of conveyance ... could. not be plainer."
Moreover, it does not appear that by "ratifying, approving
and confirming" the lease, defendant agreed to be charged
with any part of the lessee's share in the production. By
paragraph 10-a of the lease, quoted in material part hereinabove, plaintiffs expressly agreed to fully satisfy and discharge the obligation to pay over to defendant the latter's
royalty share in the oil and gas produced. Consequently, it
seems only reasonable to conclude that, as impliedly found
by the trial court, defendant's ratification of the lease constituted no more than a consent that the lessee named therein
should proceed with oil development upon the condition, explicitly set forth in the lease, that defendant's rights be fully
satisfied and discharged. Defendant's royalty interest comes
not from the lease but was created and is measured by the
original landowner's conveyance.
Plaintiffs rely upon cases from other states t in which it
was held that the landowner's royalty to be paid under an oil
and gas lease should be divided between cotenants in proportion to their interests in the land or the minerals. However,
those cases differ from ours in language of the conveyances
involved, in circumstances under which the leases were made,
and in the accepted legal theories of oil and gas rights which
were applied, and consequently they are of doubtful assistance
here.
Plaintiffs argue that judgment on the pleadings was im'See Manley v. Boling (1939), 186 Okla. 59 [96 P.2d 30, 31-32];
Swearingen v. 014ham (1945),195 Okla. 532 [159 P.2d 247, 250); Murphy v. Dilworth (1941), 137 Tex. 32 [151 S.W.2d 1004, 1006] j Richard80n v. Hart (1945), 143 Tex. 392 [185 S.W.2d 563, 564-565); Shinn v.
Buzton (1946, 10 C.C.A.), 154 F.2d 629, 632-633.
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proper because "the complaint for declaratory relief in this
instance clearly stated a cause of action" (see Seeger v. Odell
(1941),18 Ca1.2d 409, 412 [115 P.2d 977, 136 A.L.R. 1291] ;
llannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945), 26 Ca1.2d 149.
1;')1 [157 P.2d 1] ; Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth (1945),
2G Cal.2d 753, 760 [161 P.2d 217,162 A.L.R. 747]), and plaintiffs "have not had an opportunity to prove the allegations
in their complaint. They should not be denied their day in
court unless the deed to Mountain View Dairies, Inc. so clearly
constitutes an assignment of landowner's royalty that no other
construction upon such deed is possible." It is to be noted,
however, that the deed to defendant, as well as the oil lease
here involved, were relied on by both parties and were pleaded
in full by defendant in its cross-complaint. In their opening brief plaintiffs assert that "The primary question for
detrrmination . . . is whether, under the pleadings, the deed
and the lease here im'olved, Mountain View Dairies, Inc., is
entitled to 811:1% or 5070 of the landowner's royalty . . . " In
their notice of motion for judgment on the pleadings plaintiffs
solemnly declare that "Said motion will be made as to said
cross-complaint upon the ground that no material issue of fact
is presented by the cross-complaint and answer thereto but on
the contrary that the only issue presented is one at law, to-wit,
the legal interpretations of the" deed and the lease. (Italics
added.) The declaratory judgment sought by each of the
parties hereto involved the interpretation of the same instruments upon the same pleadings, arid was rendered by the
court. Under such circumstances plaintiffs are not entitled,
when the judgment went against them, to now assert that interpretation of either the deed or the lease presents a question
of fact, rather than of law, and that the judgment should not
ha,'e been rendered on the pleadings alone.
For the reasons above stated, I would affirm the judgment
appealed from.
Carter, J., concurred.

